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I.	INTRODUCTION	Professor	Flaherty’s	Restoring	 the	Global	 Judiciary	 revisits	a	longstanding	 debate	 among	 legal	 scholars	 and	 practitioners: 1	should	 courts	 intervene	 in	 foreign	 affairs	 and	 national	 security?	Can	they	do	so	effectively?		Roughly	 two	 diverging	 approaches	 to	 these	 questions	 have	emerged	 over	 time. 2 	One	 camp	 has	 doubted	 the	 democratic	legitimacy	of	judicial	interference	with	foreign	affairs.3	Judges	are	not	elected,	members	of	that	camp	point	out.	They	are	therefore	unaccountable	to	the	public.	They	should	not	opine	on	matters	that	implicate	high	diplomacy	and	core	national	interests—the	kinds	of	issues	that	frequently	arise	in	the	foreign	and	security	domain.	Additionally,	skeptics	of	judicial	review	in	foreign	affairs	and	national	security	have	advanced	functional	arguments	to	explain	
 *	Doctoral	Candidate	and	Lecturer	on	Law	(Fall	2019),	Harvard	Law	School;	Global	Order	Fellow,	Perry	World	House,	University	of	Pennsylvania.	1.	 See	 generally	 MARTIN	 S.	 FLAHERTY,	 RESTORING	 THE	 GLOBAL	 JUDICIARY:	 WHY	 THE	SUPREME	COURT	SHOULD	RULE	IN	U.S.	FOREIGN	AFFAIRS	(2019).	2.	 For	an	overview	of	these	arguments	and	related	scholarship,	see	Elena	Chachko,	
Foreign	Affairs	 in	 Court:	 Lessons	 from	CJEU	Targeted	 Sanctions	 Jurisprudence,	 44	YALE	 J.	INT’L	L.	1,	1-3	(2019).	3.	 Id.	
1264	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	why	courts	should	stay	out.	Courts,	they	have	argued,	simply	lack	the	 institutional	 competence	 to	 resolve	 complex	 foreign	 and	security	matters.	They	do	not	have	the	necessary	expertise.4	The	nature	of	judicial	adjudication	is	such	that	it	simply	cannot	keep	up	with	 fast	 evolving,	 time	 sensitive	 foreign	 and	 security	decisions.	Another	common	argument	is	that	there	is	simply	no	law	to	apply	in	 this	 area.	 Proponents	 of	 this	 approach	 also	 underscore	 that	courts	lack	access	to	classified	material,	which	tends	to	be	essential	for	understanding	 the	 full	 scope	of	 the	matter	being	adjudicated	and	the	implications	of	a	ruling	on	the	merits.5	In	national	security	emergencies	in	particular,	the	argument	goes,	 courts	 know	 that	 they	 have	 no	 choice	 but	 to	 defer	 to	 the	political	branches.6	Judges	 risk	disobedience	 if	 they	venture	 into	foreign	affairs	and	national	security	in	such	circumstances	because	of	the	high	stakes	of	emergencies.	The	concern	is	that	policymakers	would	 be	 so	 convinced	 of	 the	 necessity	 of	 their	 actions	 for	protecting	 the	nation	and	swayed	by	public	expectation	 for	bold	measures	 that	 they	 might	 violate	 a	 judicial	 order.	 Such	disobedience	 would	 damage	 the	 separation	 of	 powers	 and	undermine	 the	 stability	 of	 the	 already	 delicate	 balance	 among	government	branches.	The	 opposing	 camp,	 which	 seems	 to	 have	 grown	 since	 the	September	 11	 attacks,7	rejects	 these	 premises.	Members	 of	 that	camp,	 including	 scholars	 like	 Harold	 Koh	 and	 Thomas	 Franck,	assert	 that	 there	 is	no	analytical	or	practical	difference	between	foreign	 and	 security	 policy	 and	 domestic	 policy,	 which	 courts	review	all	the	time.	8	They	stress	that	foreign	and	domestic	matters	have	 become	 increasingly	 indistinguishable	 in	 an	 age	 of	globalization	 and	 deep	 penetration	 of	 foreign	 factors	 and	international	 law	 into	 the	 domestic	 sphere.	 Furthermore,	 they	criticize	 judicial	 abdication	 in	 an	 area	 that	 often	 involves	
 4.	 Id.		5.	 Id.	6 .	 See,	 e.g.,	 ERIC	 A.	 POSNER	 &	 ADRIAN	 VERMEULE,	 TERROR	 IN	 THE	 BALANCE:	 SECURITY,	LIBERTY	 AND	 THE	 COURTS	 18	 (2007)	 (“In	 emergencies,	 the	 judges	 have	 no	 sensible	alternative	but	to	defer	heavily	to	executive	action,	and	the	judges	know	this”).	7.	 See	infra	Section	II.A.	8.	 See,	e.g.,	THOMAS	M.	FRANCK,	POLITICAL	QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL	ANSWERS:	DOES	THE	RULE	OF	LAW	APPLY	TO	FOREIGN	AFFAIRS?	43	(1992);	HAROLD	HONGJU	KOH,	THE	NATIONAL	SECURITY	CONSTITUTION:	SHARING	POWER	AFTER	THE	IRAN-CONTRA	AFFAIR	146-48,	218-24	(1990).	
2020]	 REVISITING	JUDICIAL	REVIEW	 1265	significant	 harm	 to	 individual	 liberties	 and	 broad,	 ever	 more	ambitious	assertions	of	executive	power.	This	debate	has	become	rather	stagnant.	The	same	arguments	are	 constantly	 repeated	 without	 resolution,	 and	 the	 chasm	between	the	two	camps	seems	at	times	to	defy	compromise.	What	is	 more,	 different	 kinds	 of	 foreign	 affairs	 and	 national	 security	matters	are	often	lumped	together	under	the	broad	categories	of	“political	 questions”	 and	 other	 strands	 of	 non-justiciability	 and	non-reviewability	doctrine.	The	time	has	come	to	move	this	debate	forward.	New	 arguments	 are	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 do	 so.	 It	 is	 also	essential	 to	 disaggregate	 the	 category	 of	 foreign	 and	 security	matters.	From	a	court’s	point	of	view,	a	decision	to	start	a	war	with	another	 nation	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 a	 decision	 to	 target	 an	AQAP	operative	 in	Yemen	with	 lethal	 force.	A	decision	with	 respect	 to	sovereign	 immunity	 from	 judicial	 process	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 a	decision	to	recognize	a	 foreign	state.	And	as	Zivotofsky	v.	Clinton	has	established,9	even	decisions	of	the	latter	kind—quintessential	foreign	 policy	 decisions	 predominantly	 guided	 by	 politics—may	have	perfectly	 justiciable	 aspects.	While	 the	 Supreme	Court	was	not	ready	to	decide	the	status	of	Jerusalem	as	a	matter	of	US	policy,	it	concluded	that	it	was	entirely	capable	of	resolving	the	run-of-the	mill	 separation	 of	 powers	 question	 of	who	 has	 the	 authority	 to	make	and	enforce	such	a	policy—Congress	or	the	President.	The	Court	subsequently	did	just	that	in	Zivotofsky	v.	Kerry.10	Professor	 Flaherty’s	 comprehensive	 book	 contributes	 to	moving	 the	 debate	 forward	 by	 offering	 new	 and	 creative	justifications	 for	 judicial	 review	 in	 foreign	 affairs.	 For	 instance,	Flaherty	 draws	 on	 Anne-Marie	 Slaughter’s	 work	 about	international	networks	 to	argue	 that	courts	should	be	more,	not	less	 engaged	 in	 reviewing	 executive	 action	 in	 foreign	 affairs.	 By	nature,	 he	 maintains,	 the	 executive	 is	 far	 more	 active	 in	international	networks	of	regulators	and	other	policymakers	than	legislators	or	judges.	International	networks	thus	serve	as	a	power	multiplier	for	the	already	powerful	executive.	They	exacerbate	the	problem	of	executive	overreach	and	widen	the	power	discrepancy	
 9.	 566	U.S.	189	(2012)	(holding	that	the	political	question	doctrine	does	not	bar	the	Court’s	 jurisdiction	 to	decide	whether	Congress	 could	 require	 the	President	 to	 indicate	Israel	as	the	place	of	birth	on	a	passport	of	an	individual	born	in	Jerusalem).	10.	 135	S.	Ct.	2076,	2087	(2015).	
1266	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	among	 the	 branches.	 According	 to	 Flaherty,	 this	 structural	advantage	justifies	robust	judicial	oversight	of	executive	action	in	foreign	affairs	and	national	security,	even	more	so	than	in	domestic	policy.11	One	 could	 challenge	 this	 argument,	 but	 I	will	 leave	 that	 for	another	 day.	 Instead,	 I	 briefly	 consider	 other	 underexplored	avenues	 for	 advancing	 the	 conversation	about	 judicial	 review	 in	foreign	and	security	matters,	building	on	my	previous	work	in	this	area.	 One	 such	 avenue	 is	 testing	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 functional	arguments	against	judicial	review	through	empirical	research.	The	other	 is	 developing	 administrative	 law	 approaches	 to	 judicial	review	in	foreign	affairs,	which	remain	underdeveloped	in	current	US	scholarship.	It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 these	 approaches	 bracket	 the	normative	question	of	whether	courts	should	review	foreign	and	security	measures	as	a	matter	of	democratic	legitimacy.	This	is	not	a	 question	 that	 can	 be	 fully	 resolved	 with	 purely	 empirical	 or	doctrinal	 tools.	 The	 answer	 depends	 on	 one’s	 normative	 priors.	There	is	something	almost	mythical	about	how	many	in	the	legal	community—especially	 judges—perceive	 and	 talk	 about	 foreign	affairs	and	national	security.	From	the	idea	of	“raison	d’état”	and	its	 European	 provenance12 	through	 Justice	 Sutherland’s	 famous	
Curtiss-Wright 13 	dicta	 to	 countless	 paragraphs	 in	 modern-day	federal	 court	 decisions	 and	 executive	 branch	 opinions, 14 	many	
 11.	 	See	FLAHERTY,	supra	note	1,	at	149-66.	12.	 For	 an	 overview,	 see	 Walter	 Carlsnaes,	Foreign	 Policy,	HANDBOOK	 OF	INTERNATIONAL	RELATIONS	298,	299-301	(Walter	Carlsnaes	et	al.	eds.,	2013).	13.	 United	States	v.	Curtiss-Wright	Exp.	Corp.,	299	U.S.	304,	319–20	(1936).	14.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Trump	v.	Hawaii,	 138	S.	 Ct.	 2392,	 2409	 (2018)	 (“when	 the	President	adopts	 ‘a	 preventive	 measure	 .	 .	 .	 in	 the	 context	 of	 international	 affairs	 and	 national	security,’	 he	 is	 ‘not	 required	 to	 conclusively	 link	 all	 of	 the	 pieces	 in	 the	 puzzle	 before	[courts]	grant	weight	 to	 [his]	empirical	 conclusions’”)	 (quoting	Holder	v.	Humanitarian	Law	Project,	561	U.S.	1,	34-35	(2010)).	We	are	one	with	the	dissent	that	the	Government’s	‘authority	and	expertise	in	these	matters	do	not	automatically	trump	the	Court’s	own	obligation	to	secure	the	protection	that	the	Constitution	grants	to	individuals.’	But	when	it	comes	to	collecting	 evidence	 and	 drawing	 factual	 inferences	 in	 this	 area,	 ‘the	 lack	 of	competence	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 courts	 is	 marked,’	 and	 respect	 for	 the	 Gov-ernment’s	conclusions	is	appropriate.	One	reason	for	that	respect	is	that	national	security	and	foreign	policy	concerns	arise	in	connection	with	efforts	to	confront	evolving	threats	in	an	area	where	information	can	be	difficult	to	obtain	and	the	impact	of	certain	conduct	difficult	to	assess	…	In	this	context,	conclusions	must	often	be	based	on	informed	judgment	rather	than	concrete	evidence,	and	that	
2020]	 REVISITING	JUDICIAL	REVIEW	 1267	have	 consistently	 portrayed	 these	 matters	 as	 sui	 generis.	 This	quasi-axiom	 has	 proved	 incredibly	 difficult	 to	 change.	Nevertheless,	 fact-based	 and	 administrative	 law-focused	approaches	do	allow	us	to	move	forward	from	abstract	assertions	about	 judicial	 institutional	 incompetence	and	dearth	of	doctrinal	tools	to	a	more	nuanced	and	empirically	informed	approach.	Even	if	 they	 cannot	 resolve	 the	 key	 normative	 question	 and	 fail	 to	persuade	the	adherents	of	the	democratic	legitimacy	critique,	they	could	undermine	(or,	indeed,	support)	important	elements	of	the	conventional	wisdom.	
II.	DRAWING	ON	ADMINISTRATIVE	LAW	Until	 fairly	 recently,	administrative	 law	was	almost	entirely	absent	 from	 the	 scholarly	 conversation	 about	 judicial	 review	 in	foreign	 affairs	 and	 national	 security.	 The	 debate	 has	 largely	focused	 on	 constitutional	 concepts:	 separation	 of	 powers,	executive	 power,	 Article	 III	 constraints	 on	 justiciability	 and	federalism.	 In	 certain	 areas,	 such	 as	 international	 human	 rights	litigation	and	foreign	sovereign	immunity,	the	debate	has	centered	on	particular	statutory	frameworks	such	as	the	Alien	Tort	Statute15	and	the	Foreign	Sovereign	Immunities	Act.16	Moreover,	the	field	of	foreign	relations	law	has	generally	tended	to	focus	on	traditional	forms	of	foreign	and	security	policymaking	such	as	international	agreements	 and	 relatively	 large-scale	 use	 of	 military	 force.	Attention	in	the	field	to	novel	foreign	and	security	policy	measures	that	 increasingly	characterize	modern	practice	has	thus	far	been	limited.17	Consequently,	 administrative	 law	 has	 remained	 on	 the	sidelines	 of	 the	 conversation.	 Important	 contributions	 from	
 reality	affects	what	we	may	reasonably	insist	on	from	the	Government	(citations	omitted).	
See	 also	 Louis	 Fisher,	 The	 Staying	 Power	 of	 Erroneous	 Dicta:	 From	 Curtiss-Wright	 to	
Zivotofsky,	31	CONST.	COMMENT.	149	(2016).			15.	 28	U.S.C	§ 1350	(2012). 16.	 28	U.S.C	§	1602-11	(2016).	17.	 For	 instance,	 a	 recent	 comprehensive	 edited	 volume	 on	 comparative	 foreign	relations	 law	 focuses	 on	 traditional	 questions	 of	 international	 agreements,	 federalism,	domestic	 application	 of	 international	 law,	 engagement	 and	 disengagement	 from	international	institutions,	immunity	and	comity,	and	use	of	military	force.	See	THE	OXFORD	HANDBOOK	OF	COMPARATIVE	FOREIGN	RELATIONS	LAW	(Curtis	A.	Bradley	ed.,	2019).	
1268	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	several	scholars,	including	Curtis	Bradley,18	Jean	Galbraith,	David	Zaring, 19 	and	 Ganesh	 Sitaraman, 20 	have	 begun	 to	 explore	administrative	law	in	relation	to	judicial	review	in	foreign	policy	and	national	security	matters.	Adrian	Vermeule	drew	on	examples	in	the	areas	of	foreign	affairs	and	national	security	to	illustrate	how	flexible	 administrative	 law	doctrine	 can	be	when	 courts	wish	 to	defer	to	the	executive.21	Still,	there	is	much	more	work	to	be	done.	One	of	the	reasons	why	administrative	law	may	prove	useful	in	 thinking	 about	 judicial	 review	 in	 foreign	 affairs	 and	 national	security	is	the	evolving	nature	of	foreign	and	security	policy	in	the	21st	 century.	 One	 aspect	 of	 this	 evolution	 is	 the	 significance	 of	international	 soft	 law	 and	 informal	 regulatory	 cooperation	 in	modern	governance.	Galbraith	and	Zaring	have	argued	that	judicial	oversight	 of	 these	 practices	 requires	 modification	 of	 general	administrative	 law	 doctrine	 in	 light	 of	 foreign	 relations	 law	principles  to	 allow	 the	 executive	 greater	 flexibility	 than	administrative	law	would	otherwise	allow.22	Other	key	 trends	 in	how	US	 foreign	and	security	policy	has	been	conducted	 in	 the	past	 two	decades	have	also	expanded	the	role	 of	 administrative	 agencies	 in	 designing	 and	 implementing	related	 measures.	 This	 new	 role	 goes	 beyond	 the	 traditional	diplomatic	 and	 military	 work	 of	 foreign	 and	 security	 policy-dedicated	agencies	like	the	State	and	Defense	Departments	and	the	intelligence	 community.	 In	previous	work	 I	have	argued	 that	US	foreign	and	security	policy	has	become	increasingly	individualized	in	the	past	two	decades.23	I	show	that	the	United	States	has	applied	a	 growing	 number	 of	 measures	 that	 target	 natural	 and	 legal	persons	directly	to	advance	a	variety	of	foreign	and	security	policy	goals,	 from	 counterterrorism	 to	 combatting	 Russian	 election	interference	 and	 Chinese	 nefarious	 cyber	 operations	 against	 US	
 18 .	 Curtis	 A.	 Bradley,	 Chevron	 Deference	 and	 Foreign	 Affairs,	 86	 VA.	 L.	 REV.	 649	(2000).	19.	 Jean	Galbraith	&	David	Zaring,	Soft	Law	as	Foreign	Relations	Law,	99	CORNELL	L.	REV.	735	(2014).	20.	 Ganesh	Sitaraman,	Foreign	Hard	Look	Review,	66	ADMIN.	L.	REV.	489	(2014).	21.	 See	Adrian	Vermeule,	Our	Schmittian	Administrative	Law,	122	HARV.	L.	REV.	1095	(2009).		22.	 Galbraith	&	Zaring,	supra	note	19,	at	736.	23.	 Elena	Chachko,	Administrative	National	Security,	108	GEO.	L.J.	1063,	1063	(2020)	(available	 at	 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3440760	[https://perma.cc/WG4H-RBLQ]).	
2020]	 REVISITING	JUDICIAL	REVIEW	 1269	companies	 and	 institutions.	 These	 measures	 include	 targeted	killings,	detentions,	 targeted	economic	sanctions,	no	 fly	 lists	and	other	 travel	 restrictions,	 as	 well	 as	 individualized	 cyber	countermeasures	 such	 as	 indictments	 of	 individual	 hackers	 and	targeted	offensive	cyber	action.	The	 individualization	 of	 US	 foreign	 and	 security	 policy	 has	coincided	with	greater	participation	of	a	range	of	administrative	agencies	 in	 designing	 and	 implementing	 individualized	measures.24	Agencies	like	the	Treasury	Department,	the	Homeland	Security	 Department,	 the	 Justice	 Department	 and	 many	 others	operate	in	this	area	within	broad	legal	frameworks	that	Congress	or	 the	 President	 have	 put	 in	 place	 over	 time.	 This	 has	 created	increasingly	 independent	 bureaucratic	 mechanisms	 that	 have	persisted	across	administrations.	I	call	this	type	of	government	action—administrative	agencies	repeatedly	 imposing	 individualized	 foreign	 and	 security	 policy	measures	within	broad	legal	frameworks—administrative	national	
security.	 Administrative	 national	 security	 resembles	 ordinary	administrative	adjudication	in	that	it	involves	application	of	law	to	fact	 in	 individual	cases.	The	constant	development	of	technology	that	allows	for	precision	targeting	of	individuals	at	relatively	little	cost	is	likely	to	further	expand	this	practice.	Presidential	 supervision	 of	 administrative	 national	 security	has	 largely	 decreased	 over	 time.	 Presidents	 have	 laid	 the	groundwork	 for	 these	 administrative	 mechanisms	 through	executive	orders	and	directives	at	a	certain	point	in	time.	But	the	bureaucracies	that	grew	out	of	these	actions	have	gradually	come	to	 function	 with	 limited	 direct	 presidential	 oversight	 and	engagement.25	For	example,	sanctions	executive	orders	issued	by	President	Bush	in	the	areas	of	counterterrorism	and	non-proliferation	now	serve	 as	 standing	 authorities	 that	 the	 Treasury	 and	 State	Departments	 rely	 upon	 to	 impose	 individual	 sanctions	 against	suspected	 terrorists	 and	 proliferators.	 A	 vast	 interagency	watchlisting	 system	 that	 grew	 out	 of	 Bush-era	 directives	 and	orders	 was	 expanded	 and	 entrenched	 under	 the	 last	 two	administrations.	 Interagency	 targeted	 killings	 practices	
 24.	 Id.	25.	 Chachko,	supra	note	23,	Section	III.A.1.	
1270	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	introduced	by	the	Obama	administration	survived,	with	important	modifications,	 under	 the	 Trump	 administration. 26 	Internal	oversight	 of	 targeted	 cyber	 action	 has	 become	 looser	 under	 the	Trump	 administration. 27 	The	 policies	 that	 the	 individualized	measures	 aim	 to	 advance	 have	 no	 expiration	 date	 and	 could	continue	indefinitely.	The	 administrative	 national	 security	 bureaucracy	 creates	 a	path	 dependency	 in	 the	 trajectory	 of	 US	 foreign	 and	 security	policy. 28 	Calibrated	 measures	 for	 addressing	 key	 challenges	 at	relatively	little	economic	and	strategic	cost	are	appealing	tools	for	administrations	to	use	 in	addressing	hard	policy	problems.	They	can	be	applied	within	existing	 legal	 frameworks	without	 further	congressional	approval—a	significant	feature	in	an	era	of	political	gridlock.	 Over	 time,	 public	 scrutiny	 of	 these	 practices	 has	atrophied,	 although	 once	 highly	 controversial	 individualized	measures	 like	 blacklisting	 and	 targeted	 killings	 continue	 to	 be	applied	under	the	public	radar.29	Administrative	national	security	therefore	gives	the	executive	options	that	have	become	convenient	fallbacks	 for	 dealing	with	 a	wide	 variety	 of	 foreign	 and	 security	challenges.	In	addition,	administrations	might	continue	relying	on	individualized	measures	simply	by	virtue	of	bureaucratic	inertia.	These	 factors	 create	 structural	 incentives	 for	 reliance	 on	administrative	 national	 security	 going	 forward.	 Presidents	 are	likely	to	default	into	using	those	measures.	What	 does	 all	 of	 this	 have	 to	 do	 with	 judicial	 review	 and	administrative	 law?	 First,	 the	 foregoing	 illustrates	 that	individualized	 foreign	 policy	 and	 national	 security	 measures	applied	 by	 administrative	 agencies	 have	 become	 an	 important	
 26.	 Id.	Section	III.A.1.a.		27.	 See	Robert	 Chesney,	The	Law	of	Military	 Cyber	Operations	 and	 the	New	NDAA,	LAWFARE	 (July	 26,	 2018),	 https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-military-cyber-operations-and-new-ndaa	 [https://perma.cc/6FRL-6QMB];	 National	 Cyber	 Strategy	 of	 the	 United	
States	 of	 America,	 WHITE	 HOUSE	 (Sept.	 2018),	 https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/86G7-HAW6].	See	also,	e.g.,	Ellen	Nakashima,	White	House	Authorizes	‘Offensive	Cyber	Operations’	
to	 Deter	 Foreign	 Adversaries,	 WASH.	 POST	 (Sept.	 20,	 2018),	https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-authorizes-offensive-cyber-operations-to-deter-foreign-adversaries-bolton-says/2018/09/20/b5880578-bd0b-11e8-b7d2-0773aa1e33da_story.html	[https://perma.cc/TBE6-FLK9].	28.	 Chachko,	supra	note	23,	Section	III.A.2.			29.	 Id.	
2020]	 REVISITING	JUDICIAL	REVIEW	 1271	feature	of	the	US	policy	landscape.	This	is	true	across	policy	areas	and	different	kinds	of	measures.	Technological	developments	and	path	 dependency	 make	 it	 likely	 that	 administrative	 national	security	 will	 remain	 an	 important	 feature	 of	 US	 policy	 for	 the	foreseeable	 future.	 Hence,	 courts	 are	 likely	 to	 face	 related	 legal	issues.	 Administrative	 law,	 I	 suggest	 below,	 seems	 to	 provide	relevant	frameworks	and	vocabulary	for	courts	in	reviewing	them.	Second,	conceiving	of	administrative	national	security	as	a	distinct	category	 of	 foreign	 and	 security	 policymaking	 allows	us	 to	 both	explain	and	justify	the	relatively	greater	involvement	of	courts	in	reviewing	 foreign	 affairs	 and	 national	 security	 measures	 in	 the	past	two	decades.	Prospectively,	past	experience	places	a	spotlight	on	relevant	doctrinal	tools	from	administrative	law	for	the	courts	to	use.	
A.	Explaining	Greater	Judicial	Involvement	Scholars	 like	 Shirin	 Sinnar, 30 	Andrew	 Kent, 31 	Ganesh	Sitaraman	 and	 Ingrid	 Wuerth, 32 	Ashley	 Deeks, 33 	and	 Steve	Vladeck34	have	agreed	that	courts	have	become	more	involved	in	foreign	and	security	matters	than	they	were	prior	to	9/11,	even	if	they	still	often	avoid	deciding	related	cases	on	the	merits.	Studying	administrative	national	security	helps	explain	why	this	is	so.	The	main	features	of	administrative	national	security—the	targeting	of	individuals	and	the	central	role	of	administrative	agencies—make	measures	in	this	category	more	likely	to	be	reviewable	in	court.	In	particular,	administrative	national	security	measures	have	greater	chances	of	meeting	APA	reviewability	requirements.	
 30.	 See	generally	Shirin	Sinnar,	Procedural	Experimentation	and	National	Security	in	
the	Courts,	106	CALIF.	L.	REV.	991	(2018).	31 .	 See	 generally	 Andrew	 Kent,	 Disappearing	 Legal	 Black	 Holes	 and	 Converging	
Domains:	Changing	 Individual	Rights	Protection	 in	National	 Security	and	Foreign	Affairs,	115	COLUM.	L.	REV.	1029	(2015).	32.	 See	generally	Ganesh	Sitaraman	&	Ingrid	Wuerth,	The	Normalization	of	Foreign	
Relations	Law,	128	HARV.	L.	REV.	1897	(2015).	33.	 Ashley	S.	Deeks,	The	Observer	Effect:	National	Security	Litigation,	Executive	Policy	
Changes,	and	Judicial	Deference,	82	FORDHAM	L.	REV.	827,	873-74	(2013).	34.	 Stephen	I.	Vladeck,	The	Demise	of	Merits-Based	Adjudication	in	Post-9/11	National	
Security	Litigation,	64	DRAKE	L.	REV.	1035,	1040	(2016)	(“Even	by	conservative	estimates,	there	have	been	hundreds	of	civil	lawsuits	brought	over	the	past	14-plus	years	challenging	some	aspect	of	post-9/11	national	security	or	counterterrorism	policies.”).	
1272	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	First,	individuals	targeted	by	administrative	national	security	measures	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 take	 legal	 action	 than	 a	 group	 of	indirect	victims	of	less	specific	foreign	and	security	policy	action	in	the	first	place.	Second,	plaintiffs	in	administrative	national	security	cases	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 have	 constitutional	 standing,	 which	requires	a	concrete,	particularized	“injury	in	fact”	that	affects	the	plaintiff	 in	 a	 personal	 way; 35 	a	 causal	 connection	 between	 the	injury	and	the	wrongful	behavior;	and	redressability.36	As	several	federal	 courts	 have	 already	 recognized,	 deprivation	 of	 access	 to	assets,37	restriction	of	liberty	and	movement,38	and	deprivation	of	life39	all	satisfy	the	injury	in	fact	condition.	Because	administrative	national	 security	 measures	 are	 tailored	 to	 individual	 targets,	resulting	injuries	are	relatively	easy	to	trace	back	to	government	action.	Furthermore,	the	APA	grants	statutory	standing	to	individuals	directly	affected	by	agency	action.	Section	702	of	the	APA	waives	the	federal	government’s	sovereign	immunity	for	natural	and	legal	persons	challenging	wrongful	agency	action.40	This	includes	aliens	without	substantial	ties	to	the	United	States—the	typical	targets	of	individualized	 US	 measures.	 Therefore,	 administrative	 national	security	 expands	 the	 class	 of	 potential	 plaintiffs	 able	 to	 sue	 the	government	 in	 federal	 court	 over	 foreign	 and	 security	 policy	action.	 Even	 when	 they	 cannot	 benefit	 from	 the	 protection	 of	constitutional	provisions	like	the	due	process	clause	because	they	lack	sufficient	ties	to	the	United	States,41	the	APA	still	allows	them	
 35.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Clapper	 v.	 Amnesty	 Int’l	 USA,	 568	U.S.	 398,	 402	 (2013)	 (civil	 society	plaintiffs	lacked	standing	to	challenge	an	NSA	surveillance	program	because	they	could	not	show	that	their	personal	communications	were	likely	to	be	intercepted).	36.	 See,	e.g.,	Lujan	v.	Defs.	of	Wildlife,	504	U.S.	555,	560–61	(1992).	37.	 See,	e.g.,	Al	Haramain	Islamic	Found.,	Inc.	v.	U.S.	Dep’t	of	the	Treasury,	686	F.3d	965	(9th	Cir.	2012).	38.	 Kashem	v.	Barr,	941	F.3d	358	(9th	Cir.	2019);	Latif	v.	Holder,	28	F.	Supp.	3d	1134	(D.	Or.	2014).	39.	 Zaidan	v.	Trump,	317	F.	Supp.	3d	8	(D.D.C.	2018).	40.	 5	U.S.C.	§	702	(2012)	(“A	person	suffering	legal	wrong	because	of	agency	action,	or	 adversely	 affected	 or	 aggrieved	 by	 agency	 action	 within	 the	 meaning	 of	 a	 relevant	statute,	is	entitled	to	judicial	review	thereof.”).	41 .	 See	 United	 States	 v.	 Verdugo-Urquidez,	 494	 U.S.	 259,	 271	 (1990)	 (“[A]liens	receive	constitutional	protections	[only]	when	they	have	come	within	the	territory	of	the	United	States	and	developed	substantial	connections	with	this	country.”);	see	also	Clapper	v.	Amnesty	Int’l	USA,	568	U.S.	398,	421	(2013)	(noting	that	an	attorney’s	“foreign	client	might	not	have	a	viable	Fourth	Amendment	claim”	(citing	Verdugo-Urquidez,	494	U.S.	at	261));	32	Cty.	Sovereignty	Comm.	v.	U.S.	Dep’t	of	State,	292	F.3d	797,	799	(D.C.	Cir.	2002)	
2020]	 REVISITING	JUDICIAL	REVIEW	 1273	to	 seek	 review	 under	 the	 APA’s	 arbitrary	 and	 capricious	 and	substantial	evidence	standards.42	For	 instance,	 although	 alleged	 al-Qaeda	 financier	 Yassin	Abdullah	Kadi	did	not	have	US	citizenship,	he	was	able	to	challenge	his	 designation	 by	 the	 Treasury	 Department	 as	 a	 “Specially	Designated	 Global	 Terrorist”	 before	 the	 D.C.	 District	 Court.	 He	relied	on	the	APA,	the	International	Emergency	Economic	Powers	Act	 (IEEPA)	 and	 Executive	 Order	 13,224.	 The	 District	 Court	dismissed	his	substantive	claims	in	2012.	43	Third,	 administrative	 national	 security	 measures	 are	 more	likely	to	meet	the	“agency	action”	reviewability	requirement	under	the	 APA.	 A	 government	 measure	 must	 constitute	 final	 agency	action	to	be	reviewable.44	The	term	“agency”	is	defined	in	Section	701(b)	 of	 the	 APA	 as	 “each	 authority	 of	 the	 Government	 of	 the	United	 States,”	 with	 eight	 enumerated	 exceptions. 45 	Those	exceptions	encompass	action	by	Congress,	the	courts,	as	well	as	the	exercise	of	military	authority	on	the	battlefield.46	The	term	“agency	action”	is	contested,47	but	the	courts	have	provided	 some	 guiding	 principles.	 First,	 the	 President	 is	 not	 an	agency.	His	actions	are	therefore	non-reviewable	under	the	APA.	The	case	 law	suggests	 that	 this	exclusion	also	extends	 to	agency	action	that	requires	the	President’s	final	approval.48	Furthermore,	the	challenged	agency	“action”	cannot	be	general	conduct.	It	must	
 (concluding	 that	 foreign	 organizations	 designated	 as	 Foreign	 Terrorist	 Organizations	under	AEDPA	for	 links	 to	 the	 IRA	 lacked	a	sufficient	presence	 in	 the	United	States,	and	could	not	assert	constitutional	due	process	rights);	People’s	Mojahedin	Org.	of	Iran	v.	U.S.	Dep’t	of	State,	182	F.3d	17,	22	(D.C.	Cir.	1999)	(same).	42.	 See	5	U.S.C.	§	706(2)	(1996).	43.	 Kadi	v.	Geithner,	42	F.	Supp.	3d	1	(D.D.C.	2012).	44.	 See	5	U.S.C.	§	704	(1996).	45.			5	U.S.C.	§	701(b)	(1996). 46 .	 5	 U.S.C.	 §	 701(b)	 (2011).	 Under	 5	 U.S.C.	 §	 551(13)	 (2011),	 “‘agency	 action’	includes	 the	 whole	 or	 a	 part	 of	 an	 agency	 rule,	 order,	 license,	 sanction,	 relief,	 or	 the	equivalent	or	denial	thereof,	or	failure	to	act.”	47.	 See	Adrian	Vermeule,	Our	Schmittian	Administrative	Law,	122	HARV.	L.	REV.	1095,	1107-12	 (2009)	 (“[T]he	 staggering	 variety	 of	 governmental	 bodies,	 and	 the	 extreme	heterogeneity	 of	 the	 circumstances	 in	which	 they	 operate,	 have	made	 it	 pragmatically	impossible	for	courts	to	adhere	strictly	to	the	restrictive	structure	of	the	APA’s	definition	of	‘agency’.	.	.	.”).	48.	 See	Dalton	v.	Specter,	114	S.Ct.	1719,	1724-25	(1994)	(finding	a	challenge	to	the	implementation	 of	 the	 President’s	 decision	 to	 close	 a	 Philadelphia	 naval	 shipyard	unreviewable	under	the	APA);	Franklin	v.	Massachusetts,	112	S.Ct.	2767,	2774-75	(1992)	(holding	 that	 the	APA	does	 not	 apply	 to	 the	 President	 because	 the	 President	 is	 not	 an	agency	within	the	meaning	of	the	APA).	
1274	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	be	 “circumscribed”	 and	 “discrete”.49	Foreign	 and	 security	 policy	often	involves	the	President,	and	it	is	generally	difficult	to	identify	sufficiently	 discrete	 agency	 action	 to	 challenge.	 These	 factors,	among	others,	have	protected	this	area	from	judicial	review	under	the	APA.	These	 features	 are	 present	 in	 administrative	 national	security,	 but	 they	 are	 significantly	 diminished.	 Therefore,	administrative	national	security	measures	have	greater	chances	of	meeting	the	“agency	action”	requirement.	As	I	have	argued	before,	Whatever	 the	 outer	 limits	 of	 “agency	 action”	 may	 be,	 it	 is	difficult	to	think	of	more	discrete	action	than	a	measure	that	targets	a	specific	person	or	entity	by	name,	depriving	them	of	liberty,	 property,	 and	 even	 their	 lives.	 Moreover	 .	 .	 .	 the	President	 is	 only	 peripherally	 involved	 in	 the	 application	 of	many	of	the	individualized	measures	that	form	this	category.	He	 has	 delegated	 significant	 policymaking	 and	 execution	power	to	administrative	agencies	that	do	qualify	as	“agencies”	under	the	APA.	The	President	may	be	above	the	APA,	but	most	agencies	 that	 apply	 administrative	 national	 security	measures—including	 the	 Departments	 of	 Treasury,	 State,	Homeland	Security,	and	Defense—are	not.	50	For	 example,	 in	 Zaidan	 v.	 Trump, 51 	a	 case	 brought	 by	individuals	who	claimed	that	the	US	government	had	designated	them	for	targeted	killing,	the	D.C.	District	Court	concluded	that	the	case	 was	 reviewable	 under	 the	 APA.	 The	 Court	 found	 that	 a	decision	 to	place	 the	plaintiffs	on	 the	so-called	government	 “Kill	List”	was	not	 covered	by	 the	military	authority	 exception	 to	 the	APA’s	definition	of	“agency.”52	This	conclusion	relied	in	large	part	on	 the	 Washington,	 D.C.-centered,	 bureaucratic	 nature	 of	 the	targeted	killings	process—an	elaborate,	multiagency	process	that	was	put	in	place	by	the	Obama	administration	and	maintained	with	modifications	by	his	successor.53	In	other	words,	the	court	framed	a	decision	that	one	could	think	of	as	traditional	military	action	as	ordinary	agency	actions	covered	by	the	APA.	
 49.	 See	Dalton,	114	S.Ct.	at	1724-25.	But	see	Chachko,	supra	note	23,	at	1133-34.	50.	 Chachko,	supra	note	23,	at	1133.	51.	 Zaidan	v.	Trump,	317	F.	Supp.	3d	8	(D.D.C.	2018).		52.	 Id.	at	22.	53.	 For	further	analysis	of	the	case,	see	Chachko,	supra	note	23,	at	1079-80.		
2020]	 REVISITING	JUDICIAL	REVIEW	 1275	Finally,	 cases	 pertaining	 to	 individuals	 should	 be	 harder	 to	dismiss	on	political	question	grounds	than	generalized	challenges	to	policy.	In	Zivotofsky	v.	Clinton,	Chief	Justice	Roberts	highlighted	two	 factors	 that	 should	 govern	 the	 application	 of	 the	 political	question	 doctrine:	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 “textually	 demonstrable	constitutional	 commitment	 of	 the	 issue	 to	 a	 coordinate	 political	department”	 and	 “judicially	 discoverable	 and	 manageable	standards”	 for	 resolving	 the	 question	 at	 issue. 54 	There	 is	 in	principle	 law	 to	 apply	 in	 the	 area	 of	 administrative	 national	security,	where	the	key	issue	is	the	legality	of	the	outcome	of	an	agency	 adjudication	 of	 an	 individual	 case.	 If	 the	 individual	 is	protected	by	the	Constitution,	applicable	law	includes	the	APA	and	relevant	 statutes,	 due	 process,	 and	 possibly	 other	 constitutional	provisions.	If	the	targeted	individual	is	an	alien	not	protected	by	the	Constitution,	there	remains	APA	arbitrary	and	capriciousness	review.	These	standards	are	arguably	judicially	manageable.	
B.	Justifying	Judicial	Review	Accounting	for	administrative	national	security	also	offers	a	justification	 for	 judicial	 review	 in	 this	 category.	 It	 challenges	functional	assumptions	the	conventional	wisdom	about	the	role	of	courts	in	foreign	affairs	and	national	security	has	long	relied	upon.	First,	 government	 action	 in	 this	 category	 directly	 affects	individuals	 and	 resembles	 ordinary	 administrative	 adjudication.	Resolving	 related	 cases	 does	 not	 necessarily	 require	 unique	expertise,	but	rather	application	of	run-of-the-mill	administrative	law	 and	due	process	 doctrine.	 This	 task	 is	 hardly	 foreign	 to	 the	judiciary.		Second,	 arguments	 for	 increased	 deference	 related	 to	expertise,	secrecy,	and	dispatch	lose	much	of	their	force	in	cases	pertaining	 to	 administrative	 national	 security.	 As	 for	 dispatch,	individuals	 are	 generally	 only	 able	 to	 challenge	 the	 measures	targeting	 them	 after	 the	 fact—that	 is,	 after	 their	 assets	 were	frozen,	or	after	they	were	blacklisted,	detained,	or	shot	at	from	a	drone.55	The	measures	presumptively	remain	in	place	throughout	the	 judicial	 proceedings.	 Consequently,	 judicial	 review	 in	administrative	national	security	is	unlikely	to	impede	any	urgent	
 54.	 566	U.S.	189,	195	(2012).		55.	 See,	for	example,	the	cases	cited	supra	notes	37-39.		
1276	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	foreign	 policy	 or	 national	 security	 action.	 It	 does	 not	 require	 a	quick	decision	that	courts	have	been	said	to	be	incapable	of.	With	 respect	 to	 expertise	 and	 secrecy,	 the	 universe	 of	evidence	that	the	government	might	be	required	to	provide,	and	courts	need	to	process,	in	administrative	national	security	cases	is	relatively	narrow.	 It	 should	 include	 the	 facts	rendering	a	person	targetable	 under	 the	 relevant	 authorities.	 It	 does	 not	 require	courts	 to	 understand	 complex	 international	 dynamics	 and	interests	 and	 grapple	 with	 abstract	 policy	 problems.	 Concerns	about	 “sacrificing”	 classified	 information	 are	 mitigated	 by	 the	availability	of	ex	parte,	in	camera	consideration.	To	 be	 sure,	 these	 functional	 arguments	 do	 not	 go	 to	 the	democratic	 legitimacy	and	accountability	prong	of	 the	argument	for	 increased	 judicial	 deference	 in	 foreign	 affairs	 and	 national	security.	 I	 do	 not	 suggest	 that	 debate.	 “These	 arguments	 do,	however,	 call	 for	 a	 more	 nuanced	 approach	 to	 the	 judicial	 role	when	 it	 comes	 to	 administrative	 national	 security—and	 offer	 a	justification	for	judicial	review	in	related	cases.”56	
III.	TESTING	INSTITUTIONAL	COMPETENCE		Do	 courts	 have	 sufficient	 expertise	 to	 decide	 foreign	 and	security	matters?	Can	they	do	so	despite	not	having	full	access	to	classified	material	or	the	necessary	personnel	to	assess	its	validity	and	meaning?	Can	courts	move	fast	enough	to	ensure	that	no	harm	would	 come	 to	 national	 foreign	 and	 security	 interests	 due	 to	delayed	 action?	 What	 are	 the	 broader	 policy	 implications	 of	judicial	review	in	foreign	affairs?	These	questions	 lend	 themselves	 to	empirical	 investigation,	yet	 few	 comprehensive	 studies	have	been	 conducted	 thus	 far	 to	attempt	to	shine	new	light	on	them.	Much	of	the	existing	empirical	scholarship	focuses	on	explaining	why	courts	defer	to	the	political	branches	 on	 foreign	 and	 security	 policy	 and	 gauging	 how	 often	they	do	so.57	In	other	words,	the	focus	has	been	on	explaining	and	
 56.	 Chachko,	supra	note	23,	at	1137.	57 .	 See,	 e.g.,	 LEE	 EPSTEIN	 ET	 AL.,	 THE	 SUPREME	 SILENCE	 DURING	WAR	 71	 (2003);	 Lee	Epstein	et	al.,	The	Supreme	Court	During	Crisis:	How	War	Affects	Only	Non-war	Cases,	80	N.Y.U.	 L.	 REV.	 1	 (2005);	 William	 N.	 Eskridge,	 Jr.	 &	 Lauren	 E.	 Baer,	 The	 Continuum	 of	
Deference:	Supreme	Court	Treatment	of	Agency	Statutory	Interpretations	from	Chevron	to	
Hamdan,	96	GEO.	L.J.	1083	(2008);	Cass	R.	Sunstein,	Judging	National	Security	Post-9/11,	2008	SUP.	CT.	REV.	269.	See	also	Deeks,	supra	note	33,	at	876-79.	
2020]	 REVISITING	JUDICIAL	REVIEW	 1277	documenting	 judicial	 behavior,	 not	 gauging	 its	 external	implications.	I	am	aware	of	only	a	handful	of	US	empirical	studies	that	 assess	 the	 impact	 of	 judicial	 review	 on	 policy	 outside	 the	courts,	which	is	essential	for	evaluating	the	common	institutional	arguments	against	 judicial	 review	 in	 foreign	affairs	and	national	security.58	One	 of	 the	 reasons	 for	 this	 relative	 lack	 of	 research	 is	 the	dearth	of	case	law	in	which	courts	have	in	fact	weighed	in	on	the	merits	of	foreign	affairs	and	national	security	questions.	Rarer	still	are	 examples	 of	 sustained	 judicial	 engagement	with	 such	 issues	over	sufficiently	long	periods	of	time	to	allow	for	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	policy	impact	of	judicial	review.	The	great	variety	of	foreign	and	security	cases	and	their	uneven	procedural	postures	also	 make	 it	 difficult	 to	 draw	 any	 general	 conclusions	 through	systematic	inquiry.		In	addition,	it	is	not	easy	to	measure	the	full	impact	of	judicial	engagement	on	policy	in	this	area.	Unlike	domestic	policy,	where	policymakers	are	required	by	law	to	meet	certain	publication	and	transparency	 requirements,	 foreign	 and	 security	 action	 is	notoriously	 non-transparent.	 Government	 action	 in	 this	 area	 is	protected	by	layers	of	covert	or	secret	interactions,	classification	and	 statutory	 exemptions,	 from	 the	 APA’s	 foreign	 affairs	 and	military	 functions	 exception	 to	 exemptions	 from	 disclosure	 in	Freedom	of	Information	Act	(“FOIA”).59	Nevertheless,	case	studies	exist	and	can	be	better	utilized	by	researchers.	In	 previous	work	 I	 took	 on	 this	 task,	 albeit	 outside	 the	 US	context.60	I	focused	on	the	case	study	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	 Union’s	 (“CJEU”)	 targeted	 economic	 sanctions	jurisprudence.	 The	 EU	 courts	 have	 been	 conducting	 vigorous	judicial	 review	 of	 hundreds	 of	 individualized	 targeted	 sanctions	that	 the	 European	 Union	 has	 levied	 against	 natural	 and	 legal	persons	 to	 advance	 its	 Common	 Foreign	 and	 Security	 Policy	(“CFSP”).	 These	 sanctions	 typically	 freeze	 the	 assets	 of	 those	
 58 .	 See,	 e.g.,	 Aziz	 Huq,	 What	 Good	 is	 Habeas?,	 26  CONST.	 COMMENT.	 385	 (2010)	(empirically	studying	the	impact	of	the	Supreme	Court	decision	in	Boumediene	v.	Bush,	553	U.S.	 723	 (2008),	 on	 US	 detention	 policy).	 Compare	 Yoav	 Dotan,	 Legalizing	 the	
Unlegalizable:	Terrorism,	Secret	Services	and	Judicial	Review	in	Israel	1970-2001,	JUDICIAL	REVIEW	AND	BUREAUCRATIC	IMPACT	190	(Marc	Hertogh	&	Simon	Halliday	eds.,	2004).	59.	 See	5	U.S.C.	§	553(a)(1)	(1966);	5	U.S.C.	§	554(a)(4)	(1978);	5	U.S.C.	§	552(b)(1)	(2016).	60.	 See	Chachko,	supra	note	2.		
1278	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	designated,	 impose	 related	 financial	 restrictions,	 or	 ban	designated	persons	from	entering	the	EU.	As	I	previously	wrote,	“[t]he	EU	courts	have	walked	a	fine	line	between	protecting	designated	persons	and	entities	from	arbitrary	designation	 and	 overtly	 interfering	with	 EU	 foreign	 policy.”	 The	courts	have	 consistently	deferred	 to	 the	EU	political	 institutions	when	 it	 came	 to	 foreign	 and	 security	 policy	 decisions,	 such	 as	designing	 sanctions	 criteria	 or	 selecting	 whom	 to	 target	 with	sanctions.	 “When	 the	courts	 struck	down	sanctions,”	 I	observed,	“they	did	so	only	on	due	process	grounds,	such	as	 the	European	Union’s	failure	to	state	the	reasons	supporting	its	decision	to	place	a	 particular	 entity	 under	 sanctions	 or	 to	 provide	 sufficient	evidence	to	substantiate	those	reasons.”61	By	limiting	intervention	to	the	procedural	aspects	of	sanctions	decisions,	 the	 EU	 courts	 have	 preserved	 the	 Council	 of	 the	European	 Union’s	 (“the	 Council”)	 policy	 discretion.	 They	 have	allowed	the	Council	to	maintain	its	policy	decisions	by	fixing	the	procedural	 flaws	 identified	 by	 the	 courts	 and	 re-imposing	sanctions	that	the	courts	previously	struck	down.	This	procedure-oriented	approach	provided	a	useful	case	study	for	assessing	the	impact	of	process-focused	judicial	review	of	foreign	and	security	matters.	The	EU	sanctions	case	study	is	illuminating	because	it	has	rare	attributes	as	far	as	foreign	and	security	judicial	adjudication	goes:	it	offers	a	large	number	of	EU	sanctions	cases	decided	on	the	merits	over	several	years,	as	well	as	constant	and	relatively	transparent	back-and-forth	 between	 EU	 policymakers	 and	 courts	 over	sanctions	 thanks	 to	 the	 institutional	mechanics	 of	 the	 European	Union.	 This	 allowed	 for	 both	 a	 comprehensive	 and	 granular	analysis	of	the	political-judicial	dialogue	around	this	issue	and	the	practical	implications	of	the	EU	courts’	form	of	intervention	in	the	foreign	and	security	space—due	process	review.	The	 study	 relied	 on	 an	 original	 dataset	 that	 included	 204	decisions	issued	by	EU	courts	between	July	2009	and	March	2017.	The	 decisions	 reviewed	 the	 legality	 of	 individual	 financial	sanctions	the	EU	imposed	in	the	framework	of	 its	Iran	and	Syria	sanctions	regimes—both	salient	issues	at	the	top	of	the	EU	and	the	global	agenda	during	 the	research	period.	The	study	 traced	how	
 61.	 Id.	at	4.		
2020]	 REVISITING	JUDICIAL	REVIEW	 1279	the	EU	Council	responded	to	judicial	intervention.	It	did	not	only	document	the	Council’s	specific	response	to	each	judicial	decision;	the	 study	also	explored	how	 judicial	 intervention	 influenced	 the	general	policy	principles	behind	the	individual	sanctions.	The	 study	 produced	 several	 key	 findings.	 The	 rate	 of	individual	EU	 Iran	and	Syria	sanctions	 that	 the	EU	courts	struck	down	 on	 due	 process	 grounds	 was	 very	 high.	 Seventy-three	percent	of	the	sanctions	challenged	in	court	for	the	first	time	were	struck	 down.	 If	 we	 account	 for	 repeat-challenges—sanctions	challenged	for	the	second	or	third	time	after	being	struck	down	in	previous	 litigation—invalidated	 sanctions	 constituted	 sixty-four	percent	 of	 all	 reviewed	 sanctions	 in	 the	 dataset.	 The	 results	 of	second	 and	 third	 challenges,	 however,	 were	 better	 for	 the	 EU	Council.	 It	 successfully	 defended	most	 of	 the	 sanctions	 that	 the	courts	had	previously	struck	down	(twenty-five	out	of	thirty-two	sanctions).	Policymakers	 pushed	 back	 in	 response	 to	 the	 judicial	decisions	by	relisting	many	of	the	persons	and	entities	that	won	in	court.	 Sixty-two	 percent	 of	 the	 persons	 and	 entities	 whose	designation	 the	 courts	 struck	 down	 remained	 listed	 despite	judicial	 intervention.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 EU	 Council	 did	 not	reimpose	thirty-two	percent	of	the	annulled	sanctions,	and	more	sanctions	 were	 probably	 eliminated	 in	 the	 shadow	 of	 judicial	review.	In	 other	 words,	 a	 substantial	 number	 of	 the	 reviewed	sanctions	were	eliminated	 in	 the	process	of	 judicial	review.	This	fact	 suggests	 that	 the	 process	 of	 reconsideration	 triggered	 by	judicial	review	led	the	EU	Council	to	forgo	non-essential	sanctions	in	 the	 general	 scheme	 of	 its	 Iran	 and	 Syria	 sanctions	 policies.62	Because	the	courts	only	annulled	sanctions	on	procedural	grounds,	the	relisting	option	was	always	available	to	the	EU	Council	in	cases	in	which	it	deemed	the	sanctions	important	enough	to	maintain.	Finally,	the	Council	expanded	listing	criteria	in	both	the	Iran	and	Syria	sanctions	regimes,	at	least	in	part	to	reduce	the	risk	of	further	 judicial	 intervention.	 The	 broader	 the	 criteria,	 the	 less	challenging	 it	 should	 be	 for	 the	 Council	 to	meet	 the	 procedural	requirements	of	 reasons	and	evidence	without	exposing	sources	
 62 .	 Id.	 at	 Part	 4.B.	 There	 are,	 of	 course,	 other	 plausible	 interpretations	 of	 these	findings.	I	discuss	them	at	greater	length.	Id.	at	37-40.	
1280	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	and	methods.	It	is	much	easier	to	prove	that	someone	is	“providing	support	 to	 the	 government	 of	 Iran”	 or	 is	 a	 prominent	businessperson	 in	Syria	 than	 it	 is	 to	prove	 that	 they	are	directly	involved	 in	covert	nuclear	proliferation	or	specific	human	rights	violations.	One	 could	 argue	 that	 the	 courts’	 approach	 created	 an	incentive	 structure	 that	 eventually	 resulted	 in	 greater	 potential	harm	 to	 individual	 rights,	 even	 if	 it	 somewhat	 improved	compliance	with	due	process	in	individual	cases	and	helped	weed	out	 non-essential	 sanctions.	 By	 forcing	 the	 Council	 to	 expand	listing	 criteria	 in	order	 to	maintain	 certain	 sanctions,	 the	 courts	ended	up	exposing	a	significantly	larger	category	of	individuals	to	sanctions.	 This	 critique	 has	 some	 force,	 but	 it	 seems	 to	 be	exaggerated.	 Other	 incentives	 counterbalance	 the	 incentive	 to	expand	 listing	 criteria	 solely	 for	 the	 instrumental	 reason	 of	shielding	sanctions	from	judicial	invalidation.63	The	empirical	study	suggests,	then,	that	judicial	review	had	an	impact	 on	 both	 substantive	 EU	 policy	 decisions	 and	 the	 EU	Council’s	 compliance	 with	 due	 process	 obligations.	 Granted,	judicial	annulment	of	sanctions	ultimately	did	not	help	designated	persons	and	entities	in	the	majority	of	the	cases	in	the	dataset,	as	they	remained	on	the	sanctions	lists.	Nevertheless,	sanctions	were	not	re-imposed	in	almost	a	third	of	the	cases.	As	I	elaborate	in	the	study,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Council	 did	 not	 reimpose	 judicially-invalidated	sanctions	in	about	one	third	of	the	cases	indicates	that	judicial	review	successfully	“elicited	policymakers	preferences	as	to	which	individual	sanctions	were	actually	essential	to	achieving	EU	 policy	 goals	 with	 regard	 to	 Iran	 and	 Syria,	 [eliminated]	excessive	 sanctions,	 and	 [encouraged]	 the	 Council	 to	 adhere	 to	more	 robust	 procedures	 before	 imposing	 sanctions.” 64 	The	findings	 of	 the	 empirical	 study	 lend	 support	 to	 the	 claim	 that	procedural	 judicial	 review	 could	 “reconcile	 some	 degree	 of	oversight	 of	 foreign	 policy	 and	 national	 security	measures	with	institutional	concerns	that	have	 long	stood	in	the	way	of	 judicial	review	in	those	areas.”65	By	leaving	substantive	policy	judgments	to	the	EU	Council	while	enforcing	strict	due	process	requirements,	procedural	review	“facilitated	a	dynamic	of	accountability	without	
 63.	 Id.	at	41-33.	64.	 Id.	at	5.	65.	 Id.	at	6.	
2020]	 REVISITING	JUDICIAL	REVIEW	 1281	substantially	 hindering	 the	Council’s	 ability	 to	 achieve	 its	 policy	goals.”66	Of	course,	this	study	has	clear	limits.	The	findings	might	be	a	product	of	the	different	constitutional	structure	of	the	EU,	which	explicitly	grants	standing	to	designated	persons	and	entities,	and	a	more	interventionist	inclination	of	the	EU	courts	compared	to	their	American	 counterparts.	 They	 may	 have	 been	 an	 artifact	 of	 the	subject	 matter—individual	 economic	 sanctions—and	 would	therefore	not	translate	very	well	to	other	areas	of	 foreign	affairs	and	national	security.	Further	research	is	undoubtedly	required.	Yet,	 the	 EU	 case	 study	 does	 allow	 us	 to	 study	 general	questions	 of	 administrative	 law	 and	 institutional	 competence	 in	foreign	affairs	that	are	relevant	for	the	US	debate.	It	lends	support	to	the	claim	that	procedural	judicial	review	might	be	an	acceptable	compromise	 between	 oversight	 and	 policy	 discretion	 in	 certain	areas	of	foreign	affairs	and	national	security.	Many	scholars	have	advanced	 a	 similar	 claim	 in	 other	 areas	 of	 administrative	 and	constitutional	law.67	
 66.	 Id.	67.	 See,	e.g.,	ALEXANDER	M.	BICKEL,	THE	LEAST	DANGEROUS	BRANCH:	THE	SUPREME	COURT	AT	 THE	 BAR	 OF	 POLITICS	 183-98	 (2d	 ed.	 1986)	 (describing	 how	 courts	 “can	 avoid	constitutional	adjudication	without	causing	hardship	to	litigants,	by	resort	to	special	rules	of	 procedure	 or	 to	 techniques	 of	 statutory	 construction,	 or	 both”);	 JOHN	 HART	 ELY,	DEMOCRACY	AND	DISTRUST:	A	THEORY	OF	JUDICIAL	REVIEW	73-74,	87-88	(Harvard	University	Press	1980)	(advocating	“a	participation-oriented	representation-reinforcing	approach	to	judicial	review”).	See	also	WILLIAM	N.	ESKRIDGE,	JR.	&	PHILLIP	P.	FRICKEY,	CASES	AND	MATERIALS	ON	LEGISLATION:	STATUTES	AND	THE	CREATION	OF	PUBLIC	POLICY	336-42	 (1988)	 (describing	various	 legal	process	 theories);	 Ittai	Bar-Siman-	Tov,	The	Puzzling	Resistance	 to	 Judicial	
Review	 of	 the	 Legislative	 Process,	 91	 B.U.	 L.	 REV.	 1915,	 1958-62	 (2011)	 (critiquing	 the	resistance	to	judicial	review	of	the	legislative	process);	Dan	T.	Coenen,	A	Constitution	of	
Collaboration:	 Protecting	 Fundamental	 Values	 with	 Second-Look	 Rules	 of	 Interbranch	
Dialogue,	42	WM.	&	MARY	L.	REV.	1575,	1587	(2001)	(describing	nine	types	of	structural	rules	 that	 “[facilitate]	 a	 judicial	 ‘remand’	 of	 a	 challenged	 program	 for	 reevaluation	 by	nonjudicial	government	employees”);	Hans	A.	Linde,	Due	Process	of	Lawmaking,	55	NEB.	L.	REV.	197,	200	(1976)	(examining	the	meaning	of	due	process	in	lawmaking	in	the	context	of	 judicial	 review);	 Matthew	 C.	 Stephenson,	 The	 Price	 of	 Public	 Action:	 Constitutional	
Doctrine	and	 the	 Judicial	Manipulation	of	 Legislative	Enactment	Costs,	 118	YALE	L.J.	 2,	 4	(2008)	 (arguing	 that	 courts	 should	 “raise	 the	 costs	 to	 government	 decisionmakers	 of	enacting	constitutionally	problematic	policies	rather	than	attempting	to	designate	certain	government	actions	.	.	.	as	impermissible”);	Laurence	H.	Tribe,	Structural	Due	Process,	10	HARV.	 C.	 R.-C.	 L.	 L.	 REV.	 269,	 269;	 Mark	 Tushnet,	 Subconstitutional	 Constitutional	 Law:	
Supplement,	Sham,	or	Substitute?,	42	WM.	&	MARY	L.	REV.	1871	(2001).	In	the	national	security	context,	see	generally	Samuel	Issacharoff	&	Richard	H.	Pildes,	
Between	Civil	Libertarianism	and	Executive	Unilateralism:	An	Institutional	Process	Approach	
to	Rights	During	Wartime,	5	THEORETICAL	INQ.	L.	1	(2004)	(demonstrating	that	US	courts	
1282	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	The	 study	 suggests	 that	 courts	 are	 capable	 of	 addressing	pressing	 foreign	and	security	matters	without	excessively	 taxing	policymakers	and	their	preferred	policy	choices.	It	is	an	example	of	relatively	aggressive	judicial	review	in	foreign	affairs	and	national	security	 that	 has	 created	 what	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 sustainable	equilibrium	 of	 cooperation	 between	 courts	 and	 policymakers	around	 individual	 sanctions	 decisions.	 The	 EU	 courts	 have	invalidated	dozens	of	sanctions	imposed	to	address	critical	issues,	and	the	sky	did	not	fall.		Due	to	the	procedural	focus	of	the	courts,	policymakers	were	able	to	maintain	their	original	policy	choices	where	they	deemed	them	necessary	for	advancing	EU	interests.	They	also	managed	to	reduce	 judicial	 intervention	 by	 learning	 and	 improving	 the	 due	process	 aspects	 of	 their	 decisions.	 Judicial	 intervention	 did	 not	seem	 to	 discourage	 the	 use	 of	 targeted	 sanctions	 in	 EU	 foreign	policy,	which	has	relied	heavily	on	targeted	sanctions	for	well	over	a	decade	despite	constant	judicial	intervention.	
IV.	CONCLUSION	Professor	Flaherty’s	book	revisits	a	debate	that	has	become	stagnant:	whether	 courts	 should	weigh	 in	on	 foreign	 affairs	 and	national	 security	 matters.	 The	 book	 advances	 this	 debate	 by	looking	 beyond	 traditional	 arguments	 and	 drawing	 on	 other	disciplines.	Similarly,	this	Essay	invites	scholars	to	think	creatively	about	judicial	 review	 in	 the	 foreign	 and	 security	 space	 and	 pursue	underexplored	 avenues	 for	 assessing	 and	 challenging	 the	conventional	wisdom	 in	 this	area.	 In	particular,	 it	 calls	 for	more	careful	 empirical	 evaluation	of	 the	 functional	 arguments	 against	judicial	intervention	in	foreign	and	security	matters,	and	building	on	 administrative	 law	 to	 approach	 such	 matters	 in	 light	 of	
 have	 in	 fact	 applied	 procedural	 review	 in	 emergencies);	 Joseph	 Landau,	 Muscular	
Procedure:	 Conditional	Deference	 in	 the	Executive	Detention	Cases,	 84	WASH.	L.	REV.	 661	(2009)	(arguing	that	US	courts	have	conditioned	deference	in	the	national	security	context	on	 the	 executive’s	 compliance	 with	 procedural	 requirements);	 Cass	 R.	 Sunstein,	
Minimalism	 at	 War,	 2004	 SUP.	 CT.	 REV.	 47	 (2004)	 (defending	 a	 judicial	 minimalism	approach	 to	 national	 security	 cases	 that	 focuses	 on	 procedural	 requirements	 such	 as	congressional	 authorization	 and	 hearing	 rights);	 Cass	 R.	 Sunstein,	 Clear	 Statement	
Principles	 and	National	 Security:	 Hamdan	 and	Beyond,	 2006	 SUP.	CT.	REV.	1	 (2006).	 For	discussion	of	this	theory,	see	Chachko,	supra	note	2,	at	33-37.	
2020]	 REVISITING	JUDICIAL	REVIEW	 1283	developments	in	the	nature	of	US	foreign	and	security	policy	in	the	21st	century.	Pursuing	 these	 research	 agendas	 would	 broaden	 our	perspective	 and	 allow	 us	 to	 move	 beyond	 the	 traditional	constitutional	 vocabulary	 that	 both	 skeptics	 and	 supporters	 of	judicial	 review	 in	 foreign	affairs	and	national	 security	have	 long	framed	their	arguments	around.	It	would	also	provide	courts	with	more	sophisticated	doctrinal	tools	with	which	to	address	related	cases—and	perhaps	cast	foreign	policy	and	national	security	in	a	slightly	less	mythical	light.																													
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